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Abstract 
The standard treatment of occupational risk in the labour market is conducted in terms 
of  the theory of compensating wage differentials, the basic characteristic of which is  
that workers can fully estimate actual occupational risks. However, research in 
cognitive psychology, and recent advances in economic psychology, suggest that 
individuals consistently underestimate risks associated with accidents. In this paper, 
we discuss the case when the workers systematically underestimate job risks.  After 
presenting the standard treatment of occupational risks, and  of  health and safety at 
work regulation, we then proceed to incorporate the idea of job risk underestimation. 
The paper discusses the types and impact of regulation on health and safety effort  in a 
simple framework in which workers’ beliefs concerning accident risks also play a 
role. The paper shows that a particular type of regulatory intervention is necessary for 
the risk underestimating workers not to suffer a welfare loss.  
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1. Introduction. 
 
Many studies on individual beliefs concerning risk have shown that people 
often underestimate and/or overestimate risks. For instance Kahnemann and Tversky 
(2000) suggest that in decision making people consistently underestimate outcomes 
that are merely probable in comparison with outcomes that can occur with certainty. 
They also argue that individuals are unlikely to perform the operation of subtracting 
the cost from the outcomes in deciding whether to buy a gamble. In addition, there is 
ample empirical evidence concerning similar behaviour towards risk in the context of 
occupational environment. Much specialist scholarship indicate that workers 
constantly underestimate their exposure to work risk for work accidents, since 
perceptions of risk are  influenced by pre-existing, recent or readily available 
experiences (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008) or overestimation of personal immunity from 
harm (Weinstein, 1989).  
This paper studies the repercussions of the above theoretical developments in 
the occupational safety and health framework (OSH) when the workers systematically 
underestimate job risks. In doing so the paper first briefly reviews the standard debate 
relating to the implementation of OSH. Although, it is generally accepted that there is 
a need for regulation in the case of job risk underestimation, there is no much work 
regarding the type of appropriate regulation. The paper provides a discussion of the 
types and impact of regulation on health and safety effort in a simple framework, in 
which workers beliefs concerning accident risks at workplace interact with the 
behaviour of  Health and Safety regulator. 
Thus, the following section briefly discusses the evidence of general 
systematic risk underestimation. Section 3 examines the implications of workers’ risk 
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underestimation in the context of health and safety at work. Section 4 studies the 
behaviour of the health and safety regulator in the case when there is job risk 
underestimation by the workers and the interactions between the two. The final 
section summarises the main points and provides some conclusions. 
 
2. Systematic risk underestimation 
 
Research in cognitive psychology indicates that individuals consistently 
underestimate risks associated with accidents.  Kahneman and Tversky, (1979), 
Kahneman et al., (1982); Slovic, (2000); Kahneman and Tversky, (2000) show that 
people tend to not evaluate appropriate information about the assumed risk.  Tversky 
and Kahneman, (1974); Gilovich et al., (2002) suggest that individuals employ 
simplifying rules of thumb in decision making with respect to assuming risk.  These 
rules of thumb lead to biases in the assessment of real risk and misplaced subsequent 
choices.  Research in psychology  also shows that the above rules of thumb are driven 
by an inbuilt resistance to unwelcome information which results in important 
cognitive limitations (Denscombe, 1993).  In addition, people make systematic errors 
in their perception and predictions as current emotions influence assessments of the 
future, and thus they consistently misjudge their future emotions (Gilbert 2006, 
p.109). An implication of this is that the individual’s assessment of future risk is 
shaped by current circumstances and emotions. Thus, individuals are found to 
overestimate the frequency of dramatic or sensational causes of death (homicide, 
aviation accidents) and underestimate the frequency of less well-publicised causes 
(such as stroke, asthma or a car accident) (Slovic et al 1982). For example, in an 
experiment carried out by Tversky (in Bernstein 1996) individuals were asked to 
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estimate the probability of dying from various causes.  Their estimates exhibited a 
significant discrepancy compared to the actual statistical figures. They consistently 
underestimated some risks (e.g. natural causes) and overestimated others (e.g. 
unnatural causes).   
Furnham (1988) and Thaler and Sunstein (2008) show that the individual’s 
evaluation of  risk is influenced by the immediacy of the event, the framing, the 
perception the individual’s ability to control the  risks and the anchoring. The 
individual’s perception of risk is also affected by an ‘optimism bias’, as individuals 
are found to commonly overestimate their personal immunity from harm (Weinstein 
1989), always assuming that hazards are more risky for other individuals than for 
themselves.  Moreover, Rogers et al. (2000) and Lloyd (2001) offer evidence showing 
that individuals tend to underestimate the qualitative nature, and severity of outcomes, 
in terms of their current and future impact on their health or their functional status.           
All in all, the evidence suggest that employees tend to underestimate the level, 
nature and severity of risk associated with the execution of job tasks. They 
consistently evaluate the likelihood of having an accident at work as being less likely 
than the actual risk they face, as predicted on the basis of statistical analysis and 
expert opinion. 
 
3. Job Risk Underestimation and Health and Safety  
 
The standard treatment of occupational risk in the labour market is conducted 
in terms of  the theory of compensating wage differentials  (CWD) (Rosen, 1986, 
Ehrenberg and Smith, 1997). This theoretical approach suggests that market forces 
ensure payment of wage premiums by firms to those employees who are employed in 
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risky job tasks,  which premiums persuade workers to accept less attractive  jobs that 
are associated with higher occupational risk. Hence, the theory predicts that wages 
rise with job risk,  and that wages will be higher  for more risky jobs other things 
being equal. The worker is thus able to choose from a menu of wage – job risk 
combinations that produces an  indifference curve that relate wage levels and the risks  
of occupational injury.  
Importantly, Purse (2004) criticizes this approach arguing that there are a 
number of crucial underlying assumptions of the theory that are problematic. In 
particular, the basic assumption for the theoretical validity of the CDW theory is that 
of labour mobility. This assumption might not hold in many cases, because of many  
market types, and due to institutional obstacles. In addition, workers might not be 
informed about workplace risks, and this implies that workers may seriously 
underestimate job risks. Finally, Purse (2004) provides a detailed discussion 
suggesting that the assumption that individuals are always rational decision makers, 
even under conditions of uncertainty and risk, is not consistent with empirical 
findings. Furthermore, since safety is a normal good, non-manual workers or those 
who enjoy a higher level of human capital can “afford” to select jobs with better 
working conditions (Biddle and Zarkin, 1988). Employers also offer superior market 
opportunities (both pecuniary and non-pecuniary) to high-skilled workers who have 
job-specific training (Viscusi, 1993). This implies that the wage-risk tradeoff is likely 
to be an increasing function of wealth, in which case the safer jobs are allocated to the 
highest paid individuals. 
This has repercussions for the employee’s estimation of level of the risk 
premium which they will require in order to compensate them for undertaking a 
hazardous job task. In view of the above, it appears that they will consistently accept 
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lower premiums, which in turn offer the opportunity and the incentive to the 
employers to provide a less than adequate level of health and safety. In terms of the   
standard treatment, Figure 1 shows the worker’s indifference curves and the wage 
offer curve by the employer in the case where the worker systematically 
underestimates the probability of job injury risk.  
(Figure 1 about here) 
 
The worker believes that the job risk is at level  r0 with the corresponding 
compensating equilibrium wage at w0. This combination lies on the workers’ 
indifference curve U0 and the employers wage offer curve is OC. However, if the real 
job risk is higher at the level r1, then the worker unknowingly is taking “too much” 
risk for the given wage level. This means that although the worker believes that 
he/she operates at U0 , he/she is effectively  at a lower indifference curve U1. In order 
to remain at U0 utility level, the worker should receive a higher wage rate  equal to w’. 
Thus, the difference w’w0 is the wage loss that the worker suffers due to his/ her job 
risk underestimation.  Hence, in the context of the standard framework, government 
intervention, in the form of the provision of adequate information, the setting of 
standards or the imposition of financial penalties or prosecution, might be necessary 
to achieve equitable levels of OSH.         
The standard approach to the behaviour of work safety regulator is that the 
regulator imposes a maximum level of job risk (Borjas, 2010). The way that the health 
and safety regulator imposes this maximum risk is not direct but through an array of 
safety  measures and penalties (see Viscusi, 1986). Usually, the regulator targets firms 
where there is an increase in occupational accidents and imposes stricter health and 
safety rules (Bartel and Thomas, 1985; Ruser and Smith, 1991 describe a realistic 
approach of the functioning of health and safety regulator).  
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In terms of figure 1, if the maximum level of  job risk imposed by the regulator  rmax is 
higher than the perceived job risk r0 but lower than the actual level of job risk at r1, 
and the wage rate remains the same, then the worker is at a lower indifference curve 
than U0 but higher than U1. In order for the worker to remain at the same indifference 
level  U0, he/she should be paid a higher wage than w0. In this framework, it is clear 
that when the worker underestimates the probability of a work accident, then he/she 
suffers a loss either in the form of a lower wage, or of utility. Thus in the presence of 
systematic job risk underestimation,  workers suffer a loss which can be alleviated  
only when the OSH regulator intervenes. 
 
4.  Workers’ Risk Perception and the  Regulators Safety Effort  
 
The above section offered an overview of the repercussions of job risk 
underestimation by the worker and the assumed function of the health and safety 
regulator in imposing a maximum acceptable risk. As was mentioned, the way that the 
regulator does this is indirect. The standard approach is to assume that the regulator 
implicitly sets a maximum level of risk by safety inspections, citations and penalties. 
Inspections, backed up by the threat of penalties for non-compliance, may push 
employers to comply with standards, or even to improve their overall safety programs. 
Firms monitor the regulators’ activity and respond in ways that decrease injury rates 
when perceived enforcement risk increases (Mendeloff, 1979; Viscusi, 1986). For 
instance, it has been found that in US, a 10% increase in enforcement activity reduced 
injuries by about 1%  (Scholz and Gray, 1990).  By using Canadian data, Lanoie 
(1992) reported that a 1% increase in occupational health and safety inspection rates 
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was associated with a 0.2–0.3% decrease in frequency of individual workplace 
injuries (see also Mendeloff, 2005 for a discussion of the general OSH impact on job 
injuries). However, there seems to be a lack of attention in the literature concerning 
the issue of the effect of health and safety regulations combined with workers’ job 
risk underestimation, and of the interactions between the two.   
One can investigate the above in a simple framework utilising research on risk 
perceptions. A discussion of the general case of the difference in beliefs concerning 
risk and regulation can be found in Viscusi, (1998); Salanie and Treich, (2009). In the 
specific context of safety at work, one can assume that there is a difference 
concerning the assessment of a job risk between workers and the work safety 
regulator, and that there is agreement between the two parties concerning all other 
preferences. Contrary to the standard approach, the health and safety regulator does 
not impose a maximum level of job risk but instead he/she adjusts the level of effort 
to work safety. Following the standard approach of the relevant literature on risk 
perceptions, the representative worker has quasi linear preferences given by: 
 
U(h, e, Pw) = u(h) – (1-e)Pwh – c(e)      (1) 
 
Where 
h: is the hours of work supplied by the worker with h ≥ 0 
u(h): is the workers’ gross surplus (arising from hourly wages), assumed increasing 
and concave 
e: is the level of regulator’s effort to work safety, with 0 ≤ e ≤ 1 
c(e): is the per capita safety provision cost function assumed increasing and convex 
Pw: is the probability of suffering a work accident as perceived by the worker with 
0 ≤ Pw ≤ 1 
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In view of relation  (1),   (1-e)Pwh  is the potential worker loss which depends 
on the safety effort and the hours worked. Furthermore, the cost of safety effort is 
ultimately borne by the worker, through wage loss, as firms implement safety 
regulations. Initially assume that h (hours of work supplied) is exogenous. The safety 
regulator has different beliefs about job risk, Pr,  and he/she is also aware of the 
workers beliefs Pw. This simple framework can illustrate  how the difference between 
Pw and Pr affects the regulator’s safety effort. The regulators’ decision can be viewed 
as aiming at the reduction of work accidents.  
At this stage assume two types of regulators:  Type  1 maximizes the workers’ 
welfare taking fully into account the workers’ beliefs concerning job risks. This 
behaviour is analogous to respecting consumer sovereignty and is termed ‘populist’ in 
the literature (Hird, 1994).  Type 2 regulator maximizes the workers’ welfare taking 
into account his/her own beliefs or assessment based on objective statistical evidence 
concerning job risks. This behaviour is usually termed ‘paternalist’ and it  is similar to 
that described in  the literature on merit goods (Besley, 1988; Sandmo, 1983; 
Sunstein, and  Thaler, 2003);  Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). Type 1 regulator’s problem 
is the following 
 
max U(h, e, Pw) = u(h) – (1-e)Pwh – c(e)      (2) 
   e 
 
The solution yields the following expression 
 
Pwh = c’(e)       (3) 
 
Expression (3) implies that the marginal benefit, as perceived by this type of 
regulator, is equal to the marginal cost of safety effort. It is also clear that in the case 
that the worker underestimates job risk, that is Pw < Pr, the regulator under-invests  in 
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safety provision and technology compared to the case when Pw = Pr. In the context of 
this study, this implies that the maximum risk imposed by type 1 regulator (the level 
of the safety effort determines the level of the maximum risk), is lower than the actual 
risk. In terms of Figure 1, the level of risk imposed, is lower than the objective r1 and 
as a result, the worker suffers a loss under this regulatory regime.   
Type 2 regulator is assumed to have an objective risk assessment of statistical 
probabilities of a work accident occurring  and thus employs probability Pr. Then 
his/her problem is the following 
 
 
max U(h, e, Pr) = u(h) – (1-e)Prh – c(e)      (3) 
   e 
 
The solution yields the following expression 
 
Prh = c’(e)       (4) 
 
Expression (4) implies that the marginal benefit as perceived by  Type 2 regulator is 
equal to the marginal cost of safety effort. Clearly, in this case, the paternalist policy 
ignores the workers’ conceptions of job risk and imposes health and safety effort 
which reflect the actual job risk probability  r1,  in Figure 1. Under this approach, 
workers do not suffer a loss due to risk underestimation. The important implication 
here is that the type of regulatory bahaviour is central in ensuring that workers do not 
suffer welfare losses. 
In most labour contracts, the hours of work are given. However, there are 
cases when the workers can choose the hours of work as in the case of part time work. 
This implies that workers may choose the hours worked in line with their perception 
concerning job risk and safety effort level, thus   h(e, Pw). In this case, for a given 
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safety effort e, the worker chooses the hours spent at work  h(e, Pw) to maximize  
U(h, e, Pw). That is: 
 
max U(h, e, Pw) = u(h(e, Pw)) – (1-e)Pwh – c(e)      (5) 
   h 
 
The solution yields the following expression 
u’(h(e,Pw)) = (1-e)Pw       (6) 
 
Concavity of u(h) implies that relation (6) indicates that the optimal hours of work 
supplied are decreasing in the perceived probability of having a work accident and 
increasing in the level of safety effort. Thus, observed absenteeism may also be 
influenced by the above factors. Indeed, evidence suggest that the highest absence 
rates are observed in secondary sector occupations (Ose,  2005;  Michie and Williams, 
2003;  Bokerman and Illmakunnas, 2008). 
It  is  also interesting to investigate the response of the regulator  when h is 
endogenous. Type 1 regulator will take into account only the workers beliefs 
concerning job risk, thus maximizes U(h(e, Pw), e, Pw) over the safety effort e. The 
difference in the behaviour of Type 2 regulator in this case, is that when h is 
endogenous, he/she has to take into account the workers’ beliefs about risk. Thus,  
Type 2 regulator maximises    U(h(e, Pw), e, Pr) taking into account his/her statistical 
assessment of job risk but also the workers’ risk perception. If Type 2 regulator does 
not consider Pw, thus completely ignoring workers’ beliefs,  the regulator’s utility 
function would be   U(h(e, Pr), e, Pr). It is easy to see that the last policy is inefficient 
because it cannot correctly anticipate the workers’ actual reaction and therefore it is a 
sub-optimal policy (for an analysis of these   issues  in a general framework of beliefs 
about risk,  see  Salanie  and Treich, 2009).   
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Since the utility of hours of work supplied are linked with the level of 
consumption, a specific functional form of quadratic utility for demonstration 
purposes can be used. Following Romer, (2001) and Cantor, (1987), this can be:  
u(h) =  - 1/2(h*-h)2    (7)      and      c(e) = 1/2 (e2)     (8) 
 
With h* denoting the maximum hours of work. If it is assumed that the workers’ 
hours are exogenous,  then Type 1 regulator maximizes  (2) with  (7) and (8) in mind. 
The solution is  
et1    = hPw     (9) 
 
By the same token, Type 2 regulator maximises  (3) with  (7) and (8) in mind. The 
solution is  
et2    = hPr      (10) 
 
A comparison of (9) and (10) illustrates the previous general conclusion that work 
safety effort provided by  Type 1 regulator will be lower than the one provided by  
Type 2 regulator if workers underestimate job risk and vice versa.  
In Figure 2, we can see the work safety effort provided by Type 1  and Type 2 
regulators. It is clear that in the case when Pw < Pr,  Type 1 regulator provides lower 
safety effort than  Type 2. Hence, the maximum job risk imposed by Type 1 regulator 
is always lower than the one imposed by Type 2 regulator. Thus, workers suffer a loss 
due to their job risk underestimation and the behaviour of Type 1 regulator.  
(Figure 2 about here) 
 
The behaviour of the worker and the regulator can be studied under an 
endogenous choice of  work hours regime. Specifically, given the above, the 
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individual worker’s optimal hours of work supplied are given by the solution of the 
problem: 
 
 
max U(h, e, Pw) =  -1/2(h*-h)2 – (1-e)Pwh - 1/2 (e2)       (11) 
   h 
 
which gives 
 
h = h*-(1-e)Pw   (12) 
 
Relation (12) illustrates the general conclusion that the optimal work hours supplied 
will be increased if the safety effort increases, and will be reduced if the workers’ 
concerns about job-related accidents increases. 
Type 2 regulator maximizes (3) in the specific form given by (7) and (8). 
Thus: 
 
max U((h(e, Pw), e, Pr) = u(h) –(1-e)Prh – c(e)       
   e 
 
s.t.  
u(h) = -1/2(h*-h)2   
c(e) = 1/2 (e2)    
h = h*-(1-e)Pw    
 
The solution gives 
 
                h*Pr -2PrPw +Pw2  
e
 t2    =   -------------------------     Є[0,1]      (13) 
                1-2PrPw +Pw2 
 
 
Expression (13) implies that the work safety effort provided by  Type 2 regulator is 
decreasing and then increasing with the workers’ belief towards job risk (Pw). The 
minimum of relation (13) is at identical job risks beliefs  when Pw = Pr. In Figure 3 
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we can see that  Type 2 regulator’s safety effort is at a minimum only at identical job 
risk assessments between the regulator and the workers. After this point, the safety 
effort increases as the workers’ beliefs concerning job risk are increasing (for 
illustrative purposes, h* has been normalized to unity). 
(Figure 3 about here) 
 
In contrast,  Type 1 regulator maximizes: 
 
 
max U((h(e, Pw), e, Pw) = u(h) –(1-e)Pwh – c(e)       
   e 
 
s.t.  
u(h) = -1/2(h*-h)2   
c(e) = 1/2(e2)    
h = h*-(1-e)Pw    
 
 The solution gives: 
 
                  Pw (Pw- h*)  
e
 t1    =   -----------------     Є [0,1]      (14) 
                    Pw2 - 1 
 
 
As in the general case, Figure 4 shows that  Type 1 regulator’s safety effort is lower 
than Type 2 regulator’s effort up to  Pw = Pr and increases in accordance with the rise 
in workers’ conception of job risk (for illustrative purposes, h* has been normalized 
to unity). Again, risk underestimating workers are suffering when Type 1 regulatory 
policy is followed. Furthermore,  the important implication is that in all cases the 
difference in beliefs concerning job risks always calls for more regulatory 
intervention even when the regulator follows a Type 2 policy (for a discussion of the 
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general case, see Salanie  and Treich, 2009). Furthermore, this is independent of the 
worker under-estimating the risk of a work accident. 
(Figure 4 about here) 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Research in psychology shows that individual perception about risk at work is 
influenced by pre-existing, recent or readily available experiences. Specifically, 
overestimation of personal immunity from harm has been shown to cause people to 
often underestimate and/or overestimate risks. This systematic bias in risk of 
accidents or illness at work underestimation makes the market solutions to OHS 
provision guided by the theoretical constructions of the Compensating Wage 
Differentials Theory ineffective in providing adequate OSH provision to those who 
are exposed to such risks. This paper studied the repercussions for the implementation 
of OSH and provided a discussion of the types and impact of regulation on health and 
safety effort. In particular, given that workers are very likely to systematically 
underestimate occupational risks, the paper examined the consequences of this 
combined with the bahaviour of safety regulators. The  discussion indicated that when 
the safety regulator follows a  policy entirely based on workers beliefs concerning job 
risks, will always provide less safety effort than a safety regulator who takes into 
account the objective risk probability too.  This result  holds for exogenous, but also 
for endogenous, hours of work.  In terms of the standard  OSH framework, this 
implies that  the risk underestimating workers might suffer a loss even when there is  
regulatory intervention which follows their beliefs.   
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Thus, this study indicates that a particular type of regulation is necessary for 
an economy to attain efficient and equitable levels of OSH.  The basis of  this type of 
regulation is the actual probability of occupational  risk. In this sense, the regulatory 
activity should take into account  the objective probability of accident or illness at 
work for the particular occupation, and intervene by setting appropriate health and 
safety  standards. Monitoring and enforcing these standards (by the imposition of 
financial penalties or prosecution to non-compliers) seems to be necessary given the 
observed tendency of  workers’ job risk underestimation .   
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Figure 1: The worker’s indifference curves and the wage offer curve by the employer 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  The work safety effort provided by  Type 1 and Type 2 regulators when h 
is given. 
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Figure 3: Type 2 regulator’s safety effort when h is endogenous. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Type 1 regulator’s safety effort when h is endogenous. 
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